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Abstract—This paper is concerned with RFID tagged
objects in a supply chain management system. Such objects
are read by multiple readers both in known locations (secure
zone with online readers) as well as unknown locations
(insecure zone with offline readers). In the secure zone, the
primary requirement is to read a large number of tags with
high speed. In the insecure zone, the primary requirement
is to preserve the privacy of a tagged object. We present an
EPCglobal Class-1 Gen-2 Version 1.2.0 standard compliant
scheme which allows RFID tags to be authenticated by
readers throughout the supply chain lifecycle while meeting
the requirements of both the secure and insecure zones.
Keywords-RFID; Supply Chain Management; Online
Readers; Offline Readers; Privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
The EPCglobal Class-1 Gen-2 Version 1.2.0
(EPCC1G2) standard [1] specifies low-cost UHF
tags which operate in the frequency range of 860-960
MHz and have a read range of 2-10 meters. These tags
are typically deployed in supply chain management
systems for automated inventory checks. The UHF air
interface protocol (explained in Section III-C) defines
the standard of communication between a reader and a
tag. The reader first selects a group of tags to be read in
its vicinity. It then initiates an inventory round to read
each tag’s content until the whole group is read. Finally
it enters into an access phase for writing into a tag’s
memory if required using a built-in Access password.
However, there are privacy issues associated with this
class of tags [2]. Since the standard does not elaborate on
any specific authentication mechanism, a tag will respond
to every query sent by a compatible reader. This causes
privacy concerns as follows:
1) Content Privacy. An illegitimate reader can learn
sensitive information associated with a tag’s identi-
fier such as type, price, expiry etc. This can be used
to profile the tag holder such as shopping habits,
medical history and other private information.
2) Location Privacy. An attacker can track a tag carrier
since the tag’s electronic product code (EPC) is a
unique and static identifier.
RFID systems using EPC tags cannot implement com-
putationally intensive privacy-preserving protocols due to
their limited resources. EPC tags have limited memory and
computation capabilities. These are passive tags and draw
power from a reader in order to compute and communi-
cate. In addition, the amount of data transmitted between
a tag and a reader should not be excessive, bounded by
the available bandwidth.
To better understand the RFID system deployment, we
reproduce an example of the supply chain management as
given in [3] for illustration. Figure 1 depicts the journey
of a pack of razor blades from its manufacturer to a
consumer. We start with the manufacturer where one pallet
consists of 90 cases with each case containing 72 packs.
Therefore considering the pallet, cases and packs are all
tagged, a total of 6571 tags reach to a distribution center
in one large group. This large pallet is then de-palletized
and assembled back into smaller pallets depending on the
orders given by retail stores. Considering a smaller pallet
can hold up to 10 cases, each pallet will now carry 730
tags stored in the backroom of a retail store. Normally
up to two cases are displayed on the store shelf and a
consumer may pick few packs to purchase. Following are
typical hierarchy of some of the objects:
• Razor blades: 6571→ 730→ 144→ 5
• DVDs: 5040→ 2520→ 400→ 24
• Pharmaceuticals: 7200→ 1920→ 150→ 6
These hierarchies may differ for various objects and re-
tailers. The important point to note here is that the number
of tags (tagged items) reduces in size from manufacturer
to end-user. The larger group of tags is read by readers in
a physically secure environment, whereas as the smaller
number of tags, reaching to store shelf and consumers, is
exposed to adversaries. Considering a typical supply chain
process, we divide the lifecycle of a tag into the following
two zones (see example given in [3] for illustration):
1) Secure Zone with Online Readers. This zone is
assumed to be secure from all adversaries. A large
number of tags are scanned by a limited number of
known readers in this zone. Since the position of
all the readers is known, these readers either share
the database held with back-end server which stores
shared secrets for each tag, or secrets can be securely
transferred to those reader’s local databases. The
main requirement in this zone is fast reading of the
large number of passing tags.
2) Insecure Zone with Offline Readers. This zone is
assumed to be insecure and open to adversaries. A
comparatively smaller number of tags are scanned
by unknown readers here. The position of readers is
unknown and their local servers do not share secrets
with tags. The main requirement here is to preserve
privacy, while it is reasonable to compromise on read
speed since the number of tags is smaller.
Figure 1. Object’s Journey in RFID-enabled Supply Chain Management.
Section II comments on existing approaches to preserv-
ing privacy of RFID tags in a supply chain management
system. Section III outlines our proposed scheme. Sec-
tion IV carries out an analysis of our proposal.
II. EXISTING WORK
Various ideas for addressing privacy issues in supply
chain management systems have been suggested. Some of
these proposals [2], [4], [5] are based on shared secrets
(online authentication schemes) and do not address the
requirements for tags to be scanned by offline readers.
Furthermore, some of these [6], [7] are not EPCC1G2
standard compliant, while some [8], [9] require user inter-
vention in order to preserve the privacy of a tagged object.
A. Password Protected Online Authentication Schemes.
The scheme given in [2] involves disabling RFID tags
at checkouts using the existing Kill password. However,
secure transfer of Kill passwords to offline readers with
unknown locations is not feasible. By disabling tags,
after-sales features such as receipt-less returns, automated
warranty claims and recycling are not automatically facil-
itated. The scheme in [4] uses built-in Kill and Access
passwords in an EPCC1G2 compliant tag for mutual au-
thentication. While this mechanism avoids killing the tags
permanently, a source must know its end destination in
order to transfer corresponding passwords. Thus, readers
must know all the passwords of potential tags, which
could be millions in number, and thus requires a dedicated
database. A small retail store cannot afford the luxury
of a back-end database and an end-user cannot carry IT
equipment in order to transfer all the passwords related to
their tags. The proposal in [5] suggests using pseudonyms
instead of the original identifiers of tags. However, fixed
pseudonyms facilitate tracking, whereas cryptographically
changing pseudonyms require readers to possess the same
key and stay synchronized. Moreover, a central repository
storing all pseudonyms requires access tokens. All of these
schemes thus only work with online readers.
B. Additional Privacy Preserving Devices.
Another scheme proposed in [10] uses appropriate pre-
fixes to EPC and an additional blocker tag to preserve
the privacy of tags. For example, all the tags attached to
sold items are declared to be private (no reader can query
the tag) by setting their EPC’s prefix bit(s) to some pre-
determined value. If an unauthorized reader queries these
tags, the blocker tag, acting as intermediary, suppresses its
queries. As well as requiring an additional blocker tag, this
scheme also requires writing/setting the appropriate prefix
into a tag’s EPC memory (for example at point of sale).
This scheme is based on querying a tag using a binary-tree
search algorithm and is not EPCC1G2 compliant.
The proposals given in [11]–[13] use a proxy device
to suppress the stealth scanning of a tag’s content. The
proxy device acts as an intermediary between reader
and tag. This smart device makes intelligent decisions in
determining the legitimacy of a reader. However in these
proxy devices, acquire and release control of tags during
ownership transfer is difficult. It is also difficult to entirely
suppress reader’s commands and tag’s replies.
C. Distance Bounding Protocols.
There are many proposals for distance bounding pro-
tocols [7], [14], [15] which determine the legitimacy of
a reader based on its proximity, typically calculated from
signal strength and query-to-response time measurements.
However, since the read ranges vary considerably depend-
ing on the transmitted powers, antenna sensitivities and
environment, the adversary may send a stronger signal
than prescribed and read over a longer distance with
a better signal-to-noise ratio. Therefore, these schemes
can fail against such attacks. Moreover these protocols
typically require additional circuitry in low-cost tags and
are not EPCC1G2 compliant.
D. Relabeling and Partial Destruction.
Similarly some proposals suggest partial destruction of
important and secret information of a tag. Relabeling [8] is
one such proposal which requires changing the tag’s label
from secret to some public value in order to preserve the
tag’s privacy when the tag travels in the insecure zone.
Partial destruction using splitting [9] requires two tags
(one carrying the private information while the other has
public information) on every item. The tag carrying secret
information is removed to preserve the privacy when in
the insecure zone. Both of these schemes require user
interaction.
E. Bit Throttling and Secret Sharing Schemes.
To deter sporadic reading of a tag’s secret content, the
scheme in [6] reveals the secret content one bit at a time
and thus delays the process of promiscuous reading of the
tag’s content. This makes it harder for a sporadic adversary
to disclose or track a particular tag. However the data rate
of this scheme is very low and it also requires additional
circuitry to perform this task. Determining the sequence
of bits for transmission is also a problem as sequential
transmission (starting from the least significant bit) can
reveal important information through only the first few
disclosed bits (for example, the first four bits of the EPC
reveal the commercial code and the next four suggest the
size).
The scheme suggested in [3] adopts secret sharing
where shares are distributed amongst different tags across
time and space. When individual tags are sold to different
customers, their privacy is preserved as an individual
share does not reveal any sensitive information. However,
warranty claims become cumbersome in these scenarios
because an individual customer carries only one share of
the secret and also needs to collect other shares which are
distributed amongst other unknown customers. Another
potential problem with this scheme is clandestine tracking
as secret shares are static and do not change.
The proposal in [16] is based on delayed transmission
of the secret value using linear feedback shift registers
(LFSR). This proposal is suitable in scenarios where the
number of tags is small as it takes time to transmit
the complete secret. It therefore does not address the
requirement of high speed reading of a large number
of tags in the secure zone. It also requires additional
functionality other than the standard.
F. Our Scheme.
In this paper, we consider taking an EPCC1G2 compli-
ant approach that fulfills the requirements of both fast read
speed when a large number of tags are read by online read-
ers in the secure zone, as well as preserving the privacy
of a tag when read by offline readers in the insecure zone.
Our unified scheme is based on delaying the disclosure of
the secret until a certain time threshold is achieved and
adapts between online and offline authentication without
user intervention. We focus our comparative analysis as
shown in Table I on the schemes presented in [3], [6],
[16] since these are the only other schemes which use
related techniques.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
We now explain our proposed scheme which provides
privacy to EPCC1G2 compliant RFID systems deployed
in a supply chain management system.
A. Adversarial Model
We make the following assumptions about the capability
of an adversary:
1) An adversary can conduct both passive and active
attacks. Our scheme protects against passive at-
tacks (eavesdropping both the forward and backward
channels) and active attacks except for physical
capture and tampering attacks.
2) An adversary cannot take over an ongoing authenti-
cation round because when the tag receives queries
from multiple readers, it detects a collision and stops
responding (we assume the use of a reader anti-
collision algorithm, see [1]).
3) An adversary cannot learn the update values of
RN16 and Access password (refer to Table II) as
only a legitimate reader in possession of the tag can
update its memory.
The notation required is shown in Table II.
B. Goals
Considering a supply chain process consisting of the
two zones identified in Section I, our scheme is designed to
achieve the following goals in the presence of an adversary
as defined in Section III-A.
1) Content Privacy: Support privacy of a tag’s content,
wherever this is required.
2) Location Privacy: Support privacy of the location
of a tag in order to prevent tracing and tracking of
the tag, wherever this is required.
3) EPCC1G2 Compliance: Fit into low-cost
EPCC1G2 compliant tags.
4) Fast Read Speed: Support a fast read speed, wher-
ever this is particularly required when the number
of tags is large.
5) User Transparency: Adapt according to the status
of the reader (i.e., online or offline) without user
intervention.
C. Overview of Protocol
We use the existing functionality of EPCC1G2 standard
tags [1]. The standard defines the ultra high frequency
(UHF) air interface protocol shown in Figure 2. We now
give an overview of our proposed protocol. Note that we
need to make a couple of very minor changes to the
standard in order to support an authentication mechanism
(see also Section IV-C).
1) Initialization. In the original standard [1], each tag
generates a random 16-bit number RN16 on the fly.
We suggest that each tag is initialized using a unique
random RN16 in its local group. It is important to
note that this limits only a group size to 216 tags
and does not affect the EPC which is 96−bit unique
code. This modification can easily be incorporated
into the standard. Initially manufacturers can write
this into the tag’s memory and later the server, in
possession of the corresponding Access password,
can update the value of RN16 by writing into the
tag’s memory, using a compatible reader. Since a
server keeps updated record of groups of tags, it
can ensure unique allocation of updated RN16.
2) Initial Identification. This unique random RN16 is
used to identify a tag in the reader’s back-end server.
3) Mutual Authentication. We incorporate a mu-
tual authentication stage inside the inventory round
(see [1]). The standard defines two secret values,
Kill and Access passwords, that are embedded into
every EPCC1G2-compliant tag. The Kill password
is used for disabling a tag and the Access pass-
word is used for read/write access to the tag. Both
passwords are 32-bits long. We use the Access pass-
word for both mutual authentication and read/write
access, while retaining the Kill functionality where
required. We divide the Access password into two
Table I
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS PROPOSED SCHEME VS EXISTING SCHEMES
Security Features Marc [6] Juels [3] Amariucai [16] Proposed
Unified Approach No No No Yes
EPCC1G2 Compliance No No No Yes
Read Speed Slow Fast Slow Fast(secure
zone)
Content Privacy Reveals pattern Preserved Preserved Preserved
Location Privacy Preserved Not preserved Preserved Preserved
Information leakage Gradual Gradual Linear No Leakage
Table II
NOTATION
Notation Description
Query A command sent by the reader to a tag/group of tags it wants to read.
QueryRep A command sent by the reader to a tag/group of tags if it receives no response,
or multiple of responses from more than one tag.
SlotCounter A counter implemented in the tag which loads a random number and decre-
ments with every Query and QueryRep command.
RN16 A 16-bit random number generated by the tag and transmitted to the reader
once its SlotCounter reaches zero.
ACK A 16-bit acknowledgment sent by the reader to the tag.
PC + EPC + CRC A tag’s content plus its cyclic redundancy check.
Access(0 : 15) First 16 bits of the unique built-in 32-bit access password in each tag starting
from the least significant bit.
Access(16 : 31) Last 16 bits of the unique built-in 32-bit access password in each tag starting
from the least significant bit.
Rand A 16-bit random number generated by the tag.
Randn The nth Rand generated by the tag.
RandTh The Rand generated by the tag when a certain time threshold is achieved.
Reader
Select Query QueryRep Ack
Tag
RN16 PC+EPC+CRC16
T4 T1 T3 T1 T2 T1
Figure 2. UHF Air Interface Protocol for Class-1 Gen-2 Tags.
parts consisting of the 16 least significant bits (used
for reader authentication) and the 16 most significant
bits (used for tag authentication).
4) Standard Protocol. After successful mutual authen-
tication, tags are read as per the standard [1], as
shown in Figure 2.
5) Update. We use the access round (see [1]) to enable
a legitimate reader to update the values of RN16
and the Access password by writing into the tag’s
memory. Note that this update can only be carried
out by a server in possession of the tag’s Access
password.
6) Determining Threshold. Our offline authentication
stage is based on a time threshold value (as will be
explained in Section III-E). Therefore it is impor-
tant to determine a suitable threshold value which
prevents an adversary from disclosing the contents
of the tag or identifying its location. As per the
standard, the reader powers up the tag, sends the
select and query commands, receives the response
(RN16) from the tag, and then transmits an ACK
in response. If the ACK is valid, the tag answers
back by transmitting its content. The reader then
powers down the tag. The whole process ignor-
ing the proposed mutual authentication messages
takes approximately 35 milliseconds (see [1]). A
legitimate offline reader does not power down the
tag until the required time threshold is achieved.
Considering power down time is 1 millisecond,
one cycle of the standard scanning process without
powering down the tag will take approximately
34 milliseconds. Consider a realistic scenario for
supply chain management systems where legitimate
offline readers are present in retail stores and smart
home appliances. These readers can scan the tags
for a relatively long time and then change their
status to online after obtaining the shared secret
when the time threshold is achieved. The precise
time threshold value can be set by a manufacturer
depending on the application.
The overview of the protocol is shown in Figure 3. Our
scheme starts when a reader sends the acknowledgment,
which is compared with the value of the Access password
stored in the tag. If it matches, our online part of the
authentication scheme takes over, otherwise it switches to
offline mode. Since reader is only an intermediary device
between a server and a tag, each reader is connected
to either a back-end server with stored shared secrets
with the tag (online readers) or local servers without any
information about tags. This connection between reader
and server is assumed to be secure, hence we use the
term of only reader to encompass reader, server and their
communicating channel. Both the online and the offline
mechanisms are explained in subsequent sections.
Start
Reader sends ACK
ACK=?
Access Pin
Send EPC+PC+CRC
Yes
ACK=?
Mem RN
No
Abandon protocol
No
Send next RN
Yes
Figure 3. Overview of the Proposed Scheme.
D. Online Authentication Stage
Online authentication is based on shared secrets. Online
readers have known locations, and secret passwords (Kill
and Access) for each tag are securely distributed to every
reader in the chain (more precisely all readers share the
database storing secret passwords of each tag). The main
requirement here is to achieve a fast read rate, since
the number of tags is large and the area is considered
to be physically secure (see Section I). Since the UHF
Air Interface Protocol does not define any authentication
mechanism [1], we modify the standard functionality by
changing the RN16 sent by the tag and the ACK sent
by the reader to achieve mutual authentication. Our online
authentication scheme is motivated by [4] and defined as
follows:
1) Initialization. Each tag is initialized with a unique
RN16.
2) Initial Identification. Online readers identify a par-
ticular tag using RN16 as an index to its database.
3) Mutual Authentication. A valid ACK is now the
16 LSBs of the Access password. Once a tag
receives a valid ACK, the reader is regarded to
be online and legitimate. The tag now sends the 16
MSBs of its Access password, which the reader uses
to authenticate the tag.
4) Standard Protocol. After successful mutual au-
thentication, the standard as shown in Figure 2 is
followed. The reader sends a standard ACK (which
is the same RN16 sent initially by the tag) and the
tag in return sends its information to the reader.
5) Update. The legitimate reader updates RN16 and
Access password values in the tag securely (consid-
ering the reader is now in possession of the tag).
The online authentication scheme is summarized in Fig-
ure 4, assuming the protocol follows the standard until the
slot counter of a particular tag reaches zero.
E. Offline Authentication Stage
Offline readers have unknown locations and it is in-
feasible to distribute secret passwords (Kill and Access)
for each tag securely to every such reader. The main
requirement here is to preserve privacy with a willingness
to compromise on read speed since the number of tags is
small and the area is considered to be physically insecure
(see Section I). The UHF Air Interface Protocol works as
in the standard except that the RN16 sent by the tag and
ACK sent by the reader changes in the proposed scheme
(see Section III-C). The ACK is checked by the tag in
order to establish which of the following three states apply:
1) Valid if ACK is equal to the 16 least significant bits
of the Access password.
2) Semi-valid if ACK is equal to the random values
generated by tag.
3) Invalid otherwise.
The offline part of our authentication scheme is motivated
by [16]. This scheme is defined as follows:
1) Initialization. Each tag is initialized with a unique
fixed RN16.
Online Reader Tag (SlotCounter=0)
(1) Initialized with a
unique 16-bit RN16.
(2) RN16
(3) Uses RN16 to search
database and extract Access
password for the tag.
(4) Valid ACK = Access(0 : 15)
(5) Authenticates the
reader by comparing
Access(0 : 15) sent
by the reader with the
value stored in the tag’s
memory. If both are equal,
then the reader is online,
else either the reader is
offline or not legitimate.
(6) Access(16 : 31)
(7) Authenticates
Tag by comparing
Access(16 : 31) sent
by Tag with the value
stored in database. If
both are equal, then the
tag is legitimate, else
the tag is not genuine.
(8) Standard ACK = RN16
(9) On receiving a
valid ACK, follows
EPCC1G2 Standard.
(10) PC + EPC + CRC
(11) Updates RN16
and Access password
in database and writes
the same values in
tag’s memory using
old Access password.
(12) Write new (RN16 + Access password) securely
(13) Updates its memory
with new RN16 and
Access password.
Figure 4. Online Authentication Scheme for Class-1 Gen-2 Tags.
2) Initial Identification. Offline readers cannot iden-
tify a particular tag using RN16, so it cannot send
a valid ACK, which is the 16 LSBs of the Access
password of the corresponding tag.
3) Mutual Authentication. An offline reader sends a
semi-valid ACK, which is equal to the RN16 (as
per the existing standard [1]) sent by the tag. The
tag first checks its validity by comparing it with the
16 LSBs of the built-in Access password. In case of
failure, it checks its semi-validity by comparing this
with the RN16 stored in its memory. If the ACK is
semi-valid, the tag generates another 16 bit random
number Rand1, XORs it with the previous RN16,
transmits the result Sum1 to the reader, and stores
Rand1 and Sum1 in its memory (see Figure 5).
The reader, on receiving this new Sum1, stores its
value and performs the same operation (i.e. XORs
it with the previous value of RN16) and sends the
result Rand1 to the tag (see Figure 5). The tag
continues checking for a valid, semi-valid or invalid
ACK and responds accordingly. Once this repeated
communication reaches a certain threshold, and the
tag determines (by comparing the RandTh−1 sent
by the reader with its stored value) that the reader
has spent enough time in pairing up, it performs
an XOR of the previous value of SumTh−1 stored
in its memory with the 16 LSBs of its Access
password and sends the result as SumTh to the
reader (see Figure 5). On receiving this 16-bit num-
ber, the reader also performs the XOR of this new
value SumTh with the previous one SumTh−1 and
extracts the 16 LSBs of the Access password (see
Figure 5). Once the reader transmits these 16 bits as
an ACK, the tag checks it as valid. On receiving a
valid ACK, the tag switches to online mode.
4) Standard Protocol. After successful mutual au-
thentication, the EPCC1G2 standard is followed as
shown in Figure 2. The reader sends a standard
ACK (which is the same RN16 sent initially by
the tag) and the tag in return sends its content to
the reader.
5) Update. The legitimate reader updates RN16 and
Access password values in the tag securely (consid-
ering the reader is now in possession of the tag).
The scheme is summarized in Figure 5, assuming the
protocol follows the standard until the slot counter of a
particular tag reaches zero.
Offline Reader Tag (SlotCounter=0)
(1) Initialized with a
unique 16-bit RN16.
(2) RN16
(3) Retains a copy
of RN16 and sends
it back to the tag
showing it is offline.
(4) Semi-valid ACK = RN16
(5) Checks validity,
switches to offline
mode, generates a
new random value
Rand1 and calculates:
Sum1 = Rand1 ⊕RN16
(6) Sum1
(7) Keeps a copy of
Sum1 and calculates:
Rand1 = Sum1⊕RN16.
(8) Rand1
(9) Checks validity,
generates Rand2,
calculates: Sum2 =
Sum1 ⊕ Rand2.
(10) Sum2
(11) Keeps a copy of
Sum2 and calculates:
Rand2 = Sum2⊕Sum1.
(12) Rand2
(13) Checks validity,
generates Rand3,
calculates: Sum3 =
Sum2 ⊕ Rand3.
(14) Sum3
(15) Keeps a copy of
Sum3 and calculates:
Rand3 = Sum3⊕Sum2.
(16) Rand3
(17) Repeat until certain threshold is achieved.
(18) Checks validity,
and calculates:
SumTh = SumTh−1 ⊕
Access(0 : 15).
(19) SumTh
(20) Calculates and keeps a
copy: Access(0 : 15) =
SumTh ⊕ SumTh−1.
(21) Valid ACK = Access(0 : 15)
(22) Checks validity,
switches to online mode.
(Refer to Figure 4)
Figure 5. Offline Authentication Scheme for Class-1 Gen-2 Tags.
IV. ANALYSIS
In this section, we carry out an analysis of our protocol
for the desired goals stated in Section III-B and compare
it to existing proposals [3], [6], [16] which are based
on a similar mechanism as mentioned in Section II. We
summarize this comparison in Table I.
A. Content Privacy
A common criticism of the use of RFIDs is that the tags
reveal content promiscuously to any compatible reader.
Our scheme protects the content of a tag by only sending
them to authorized or trusted readers. In the secure zone
with online readers, the tag sends its content only after
successful mutual authentication. Considering the area is
secured, we rule out the possibility of content disclosure
to any adversary. In the insecure zone with offline readers,
the tag first sends random information if it does not trust
a reader until a certain trust threshold is achieved, then
the content of the tag are sent after a successful mutual
authentication phase. A recent proposal [16] based on
the concept of transmitting a shared secret in parts tends
to leak information after every transmission unless the
secret is revealed. Our scheme does not reveal any infor-
mation until the trust threshold is achieved. We analyze
the strength of our scheme by considering the following
adversarial behaviour:
1) Online Adversary: We assume that online readers
scan the tag in a secure area (see Section III-A).
Therefore, we rule out the possibility of a passive
adversary listening to communication between an
online reader and a tag. However, an active adver-
sary can act as online (in the insecure area) and the
secret Access password can be retrieved by a brute
force attack. Simply, a reader can send a random
ACK to a tag until the tag sends back its content,
which means that the reader has found the correct
password. In each guess, the online adversary has to
complete the scanning cycle as mentioned above. If
the tag does not answer back with its content, the
reader powers down the tag and repeats the sequence
with a different value of the ACK. Considering the
EPCC1G2 specification, each try takes 35 millisec-
onds and a 16-bit password is thus exhausted in
about 38.23 minutes. We consider that an adversary
who is not in possession of the tag will not have
sufficient time to do this before being detected.
2) Sporadic Offline Adversary: A more realistic sce-
nario is of a sporadic adversary who is capable
only of scanning or eavesdropping some of the
random information exchanged between a reader
and a tag. This random information will not be
sufficient to acquire the threshold or disclose the
tag’s content. Thus the adversary has to keep track of
all the communication sessions. However, a sporadic
adversary can eavesdrop either the last session (see
step 21 onwards in Figure 5), or the second-last
session (see steps after the threshold is achieved in
Figure 5) by chance. The probability of success will
be 1/n for a threshold of n − 1 random sessions
since each session is independent. Moreover, the ad-
versary cannot take over an ongoing authentication
round (see Section III-A) and has to wait for it to
complete. Once an authentication round is complete,
the adversary cannot replay the eavesdropped values
or act as online since these values are updated in the
tag (see Section III-C).
3) Dedicated Offline Attacker: A dedicated offline
adversary is assumed to act like a legitimate offline
reader. This adversary is able to scan the tag until
a threshold is achieved. Therefore, the adversary is
able to disclose the Access password and content
of the tag. After achieving the Access password,
the adversary will impersonate as an online reader.
It can thus downgrade the legitimate owner to offline
by updating the tag to its own values of RN16 and
Access password. However, if the adversary is not
in possession of the tag, this success will be one
time only. The adversary will no longer be able to
disclose this tag’s content since the Access pass-
word is updated by the legitimate owner (in its next
communication with the tag). The countermeasure
for such an adversary is to set the time threshold
value to be sufficiently high that this adversary can
be detected before the tag reveals its secrets.
B. Location Privacy
Our scheme preserves the location privacy of a tag
and hence prevents its tracking. Since RN16 and Access
password are changed in every authentication round and
tag sends different random numbers when queried by an
unauthorized reader, its location cannot be tracked. The
tracking depends on the properties of random number
generator on the tag whose specification are given in the
standard [1].
C. EPCC1G2 Compliance
Many of the earlier proposals cannot be implemented
in low-cost environments (see Section II), particularly
EPCC1G2 standard compliant tags, or require consider-
able changes to the existing standard. Our scheme can
easily be implemented in these tags with very minor
changes to the standard and uses existing functionality
as defined in the standard [1]. Our scheme does not
require any additional functionality because we are using
the existing computational capability of the EPCC1G2
standard. However, there are additional communication
overheads to achieve mutual authentication and a time
threshold. As far as storage is concerned, our scheme
requires the tag to store an additional 16-bit value in
addition to storing a random number as in the standard.
In the online authentication scheme, there is an additional
mutual authentication mechanism which is completed in
two additional messages and authentication is based on the
existing built-in Access password. In the offline authenti-
cation scheme, the reader has to acquire a time threshold
in order to read the tag’s contents. This additional mech-
anism uses the existing functionalities of an EPCC1G2
compliant tag for generating a 16-bit random nonce and
conducting an XOR computation.
D. Fast Read Speed
Gen 2 certified readers have 2 read modes: over 1600
tags per second in fast and less than 600 tags per second
in slow mode. The read speeds are automatic and depend
entirely on the actual read conditions for each tag. In
multi-tag environments, where thousands of tags are pass-
ing in front of readers, speed is of the utmost importance.
Fast read speed requirement exists in the secure zone with
online readers. Our proposed scheme reads the tag using
the same standard functionality in the secure zone with
online readers. Thus this requirement is fulfilled using our
proposed scheme.
E. User Transparency
As discussed in Section II, some of the earlier schemes
require user intervention to preserve the privacy of the
tag. These systems are prone to errors and are labor-
intensive. Our proposal adapts between online and offline
authentication modes without any user intervention.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a scheme that provides
a unified approach to tackle privacy and performance
issues in RFID-tagged supply chain management systems.
Unlike any existing proposal in the literature, it is easy to
implement in the existing EPCC1G2 standard, it provides
fast read speed in the secure zone and preserves privacy in
the insecure zone, and it adapts between online and offline
authentication without user intervention.
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